Seminar
Past
Using Deep Learning to Compute Equilibria in High-Dimensional Dynamic Stochastic Games
Ulrich Doraszelski (Wharton Pennsylvania University)
- Date12 October 2026
- Time 14h15 - 15h30
- Room Auditorium 4
Résumé
Dynamic stochastic games are the workhorse for studying the feedback loop between firms’ decisions and industry evolution, but computing equilibria for counterfactual analysis remains hard: both the state space and the expectation over successor states grow exponentially in the number of players. We combine forward simulation, projection methods, and deep neural networks to compute equilibria in games with many players. Equilibrium conditions are cast as a functional equation. Value and policy functions are replaced by deep neural networks and training proceeds by stochastic gradient descent over states drawn from the ergodic distribution using an all-in-one expectation operator. In a capacity accumulation game and an entry/exit game, we compute accurate equilibria with up to 128 firms.
Other seminars
Screening with Product Mismatch
-
Seminar
-
Industrial Organization seminar
-
Date 7 December 2026
-
Place Auditorium 4
-
Speaker or organiser Teck Yong Tan (University of Rochester)
Détails
Private Prices, Common Norms
-
Seminar
-
Industrial Organization seminar
-
Date 30 November 2026
-
Place Auditorium 4
-
Speaker or organiser Marcel Preuss (Johnson Graduate School of Management - Cornell University)
Détails
Competition and Welfare in Airport Slot Allocation
-
Seminar
-
Industrial Organization seminar
-
Date 23 November 2026
-
Place Auditorium 4
-
Speaker or organiser Sebastián Bauer (Universidad Carlos III)
Détails