Weak states often coexist alongside non-state traditional political institutions (TPIs) in "dual polities," where citizens maintain simultaneous social contracts with both state and non-state authorities. While it is well known that state-building transforms individuals' relationship with the state, less is known about how it reshapes citizens' contracts with non-state authorities. We study this question in the context of a recent property tax reform in Makeni City, Sierra Leone that simultaneously enhanced local government informational and fiscal capacity. Our research design exploits a geographic discontinuity in the reform's implementation: the reform imposed a hard administrative boundary determining which properties received tax bills, with all properties inside the boundary receiving bills and none outside doing so. We conceptualize the treatment—receiving a tax bill—as a shock to both tax demand and citizens' perceptions of state legibility. We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of this state-building intervention on citizens' social contracts with both the state and local TPIs. Outcomes of interest, measured using a survey and a set of behavioral measures, capture key dimensions of these contracts: fiscal and labor contributions, political engagement and participation, and political leader legitimacy. At this internal seminar, I will present preliminary results.