Seminar

Past

Social Learning with Endogenous Timing

Economic Theory Seminar

Juuso Välimäki

  • Date9 May 2023
  • Time 11h00 - 12h30
  • Room Auditorium 3

Abstract

We analyze social learning in a model where the players choose optimally the timing of their choices. We show the existence of an asymptotically fully revealing equilibrium for games with large numbers of players and a vanishing time delay between decision instants. We relate this outcome to equilibria in variants of the game with different informational assumptions. (joint work with Daniel Hauser and Pauli Murto)

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