Seminar

Past

Safety in Unemployment and Risky Experimentation of Young Firms

Renato Faccini

  • Date7 April 2026
  • Time 11h30 - 12h30
  • Room Online and in Room 4 of the congres space

Abstract

We develop a theory in which a lower cost of unemployment increases workers’ willingness to join risky young firms, lowering negotiated wages relative to safer firms. These lower wages encourage young firms to undertake high-upside experimentation, raising aggregate productivity. Using Danish matched employer–employee data and regional labor-market variation, we show that higher job-finding rates are associated with lower wage differentials between experimenting and non-experimenting young firms, both across firms and within firms hiring across multiple areas. A randomized survey experiment supports the worker-side mechanism: worsening unemployment prospects increases the wage premium workers require to accept employment at higher-failure-risk young firms.

Related document(s)

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