- Date3 June 2025
- Time 11h00 - 12h30
- Room Auditorium 4
Abstract
We analyze the matching of buyers and sellers in a stylized market where the quality of the sellers’ goods is uncertain, and the buyers have correlated perceptions of the qualities. We show the existence of a symmetric equilibrium for alternative sales mechanisms within matches, and we evaluate their distributional and efficiency properties. (joint work with Pauli Murto).
Other seminars
To be announced
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Seminar
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Economic Theory Seminar
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Date 8 December 2026
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Place Auditorium 3 - JJ Laffont
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Speaker or organiser Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University)
Details
To be announced
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Seminar
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Economic Theory Seminar
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Date 24 November 2026
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Place Auditorium 5
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Speaker or organiser Frank Yang (Stanford University)
Details
To be announced
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Seminar
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Economic Theory Seminar
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Date 17 November 2026
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Place Auditorium 5
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Speaker or organiser Qianjun Lyu (University Carlos III of Madrid)
Details