- Date11 May 2026
- Time 11h00 - 12h15
- Room Auditorium 4
Résumé
I study a preference relation on risky long run public projects induced by a large maturity limit of expected present values. Under common assumptions this relation has a variational representation that is related to a well known model of ambiguity aversion; it is non-probabilistic in general. The formalism generalizes Weitzman's `lowest possible rate' formula for long run discount rates to a large class of stochastic economies, gives rise to a notion of stochastic dominance adapted to long run valuation, and characterizes features of stochastic processes that cause long run cost benefit rules to be non-probabilistic.
Other seminars
To be announced
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Seminar
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Environmental Economics Seminar
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Date 7 December 2026
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Place Auditorium 4
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Speaker or organiser Milan Quentel (Universidad Carlos III, Spain)
Détails
To be announced
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Seminar
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Environmental Economics Seminar
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Date 7 December 2026
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Place Auditorium 4
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Speaker or organiser Steve Cicala (Tufts University)
Détails
To be announced
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Seminar
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Environmental Economics Seminar
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Date 30 November 2026
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Place Auditorium 4
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Speaker or organiser Zhi Li (Xiamen University - Chine)
Détails