Seminar

Past

Joint Seminar Finance - Macro: A Theory of Economic Coercion and Fragmentation

A Theory of Economic Coercion and Fragmentation

Christopher Clayton

  • Date19 May 2026
  • Time 14h00 - 15h30
  • Room Auditorium 4

Résumé

Hegemonic powers exert influence on other countries by threatening the alteration of financial and trade relationships. Mechanisms that generate gains from integration, such as external economies of scale and specialization, also increase the hegemon’s power because in equilibrium they make other relationships poor substitutes for the hegemon’s. Other countries implement economic security policies to insulate themselves from hegemonic pressure, but in doing so can inefficiently fragment the global economy. A hegemon can benefit from committing to limit coercion to attract participation in its economic network and preserve its power. We estimate that U.S. geoeconomic power relies on financial services, while Chinese power relies on manufacturing. Since power is nonlinear, much economic security could be achieved with little overall fragmentation.

Related document(s)

Other seminars

-

  • Seminar

  • Finance Seminar, TSE - TSM-R

  • Date 16 December 2026

  • Place Auditorium 4

  • Speaker or organiser Elena Simintzi

Détails

-

  • Seminar

  • Finance Seminar, TSE - TSM-R

  • Date 9 December 2026

  • Place Auditorium 4

  • Speaker or organiser Quentin Vandeweyer

Détails

Natural Disasters, Property Insurance, and Housing Markets

  • Seminar

  • Finance Seminar, TSE - TSM-R

  • Date 18 November 2026

  • Place Auditorium 4

  • Speaker or organiser Pierre Mabille

Détails