Autocrats seek to control information on their popularity to dissuade public dissent. Research in this area typically relies on Bayesian persuasion frameworks that assume an autocrat’s direct control over dissemination, overlooking private incentives for agents who implement programs of information control. Other literature suggests that agents’ incentives should greatly complicate an autocrat’s commitment to a fixed manipulation scheme (credible commitment assumption). We integrate agency problems into a Bayesian persuasion framework, focusing on the roles of intimidation, cooptation, and self-censorship as key features of information control dynamics. In our framework, an autocrat’s commitment to credible but biased information flows emerges endogenously from interactions between their repressive agents and regime critics. Counterintuitively, we find that agency problems within autocratic hierarchies can improve an autocrat’s capability to manage public perceptions. Our framework contributes to our understanding of how autocrats control information and offers a methodological advance in the formal literature of Bayesian persuasion.