Why do candidates in the U.S. rely on fundraising events to raise money from individual donors and why do donors attend such events? Public and scholarly attention on fundraising events often focuses on concerns around selective responsiveness to unrepresentative donors and candidate selection, primarily relying on anecdotal accounts. In this study, we use new data -- campaign finance filings in four U.S. states which indicate event- and non-event status of individual donations linked to candidacies and incumbent legislators -- to examine the hypotheses that events help candidates draw on individual donors’ non-ideological motivations, including material ones, and that this helps candidates fundraise when ideological donation motivations are relatively low. We find that donors discount ideological considerations when they attend events. Moreover, when legislators hold agenda power in committees overseeing particular business sectors, event donations from individuals employed in these sectors increase, suggesting that event fundraising warrants concerns about selective responsiveness to such donors. I also intend to present evidence on the extent to which event donors are representative compared to the broader set of donors as well as the underlying constituency.