Exclusionary contracts are typically litigated in intermediate-goods industries, where serving a customer requires relationship-specific investment. We embed such buyer-specific fixed costs in a naked-exclusion model with heterogeneous buyers and ask which buyers a dominant incumbent signs, and with what contract. Under exclusive dealing, selection is governed by the entrant's average cost of serving each buyer, and neither the largest nor the most profitable buyer need be signed. Whenever buyer-specific costs are non-trivial, exclusive dealing is dominated by market-share contracts: leaving each signed buyer free to purchase a calibrated fraction elsewhere deters entry as effectively as exclusivity while extracting a rent from signed buyers --- a channel of rent extraction distinct from that of Aghion and Bolton (1987). In equilibrium, market-share contracts typically foreclose more while committing less demand, and the shares demanded are buyer-specific, increasing in the entrant's economies of scale in serving each buyer. The results survive private information about the entrant's costs and buyer-specific costs on the incumbent's side, and speak directly to recent antitrust cases, including ZF Meritor, Intel, and FTC v. Syngenta and Corteva.