Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Gwenaël Piaser, “Equilibrium (non-)existence in games with competing principals”, Economics Letters, vol. 222, n. 110932, January 2023.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection”, International Economic Review, vol. 63, n. 3, August 2022, pp. 981–1020.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection”, American Economic Review, vol. 111, n. 8, August 2021, pp. 2623–2659.

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Thomas Mariotti, and Gwenaël Piaser, “Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 125, January 2021, pp. 79–93.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “The Social Costs of Side Trading”, The Economic Journal, vol. 130, n. 630, August 2020, pp. 1608–1622.

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Gwenaël Piaser, “Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 183, September 2019, pp. 258–283.

Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon, and Jean-Paul Décamps, “Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 51, n. 4, June 2019, pp. 977–990.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “On a Class of Smooth Preferences”, Economic Theory Bulletin, vol. 7, n. 1, May 2019, pp. 37–57.

Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon, and Jean-Paul Décamps, “Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and the Role of Debt Covenants”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11, n. 2, May 2019, pp. 98–130.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing”, Theoretical Economics, vol. 14, n. 1, January 2019, pp. 297–343.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse”, Revue Économique, vol. 69, n. 6, November 2018, pp. 1009–1023.

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Gwenaël Piaser, “On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 111, September 2018, pp. 1–15.

Alexandre d'Aspremont, and Andrea Attar, “Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications”, in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Luis C. Corchon, and Marco A. Marini (eds.), vol. 1, chapter 15, 2018, pp. 425–452.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “Nonexclusive Competition under Adverse Selection”, Theoretical Economics, vol. 9, n. 1, January 2014, pp. 1–40.

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Gwenaël Piaser, “Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games ”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 49, n. 1, January 2013, pp. 62–70.

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser, and Uday Rajan, “Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness”, Review of Economic Design, vol. 16, n. 4, December 2012, pp. 283–296.

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti, and François Salanié, “Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons”, Econometrica, vol. 79, n. 6, November 2011, pp. 1869–1918.

Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenaël Piaser, and Uday Rajan, “On Multiple-Principal Multiple-Agent Models of Moral Hazard”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, n. 1, January 2010, pp. 376–380.

Andrea Attar, and Arnold Chassagnon, “On Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 45, n. 9-10, September 2009, pp. 511–525.

Andrea Attar, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Gwenaël Piaser, and Nicolas Porteiro, “Common Agency Games: Separable Preferences and Indifference”, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 56, n. 1, June 2008, pp. 75–95.