

Andrea Attar

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Education

Ph.D. Economics, CORE (UCL-Louvain), 2005.

Laurea in Economics, *Summa Cum Laude*, Università di Roma, *La Sapienza*, 1998.

Fields of Research Interest

Economic Theory, Financial Economics.

Grants and Awards

Fondation Banque de France Research Grant, 2016.

Research Prize Institut Europlace de Finance, 2010.

EIEF Research Grant 2010-2012.

Distinguished CESifo Affiliate in Applied Microeconomics, 2008.

Research Prize Institut Europlace de Finance, 2006.

TMR - Marie Curie Fellowship 515598/2005, for the period 2005-2007, IDEI, University of Toulouse.

SIE (Società Italiana degli Economisti) Prize for the best italian doctoral thesis in Economics, 2004.

EDNET-EDP Fellowship, London School of Economics, 2002.

CNRS-IDEFI Research Fellowship, spring 2002.

Teaching

Financial Economics, Game Theory, Theory of Incentives (Graduate Level).

Other Affiliations

Professor (Part-Time) Università di Roma Tor Vergata.

CESifo Research fellow.

Research

Recent Papers

Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2020): Entry Proofness and Market Breakdown under Adverse Selection, revised and resubmit to the *American Economic Review* (second round).

Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2020): Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection, revised and resubmit to the *International Economic Review*.

Publications

- Attar A., E. Campioni, T. Mariotti and G. Piaser (2020): Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples, *Games and Economic Behavior* (accepted).
- Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2020): The Social Cost of Side Trading, *The Economic Journal* 130: 1608-1622.
- Attar A., E. Campioni and G. Piaser (2019): Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games, *Journal of Economic Theory* 183: 258-283.
- Attar A., Casamatta C., Chassagnon A., and J.P. Decamps (2019): Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Debt Covenants, *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 11(2): 98-130.
- Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2019): On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing, *Theoretical Economics* 14(1): 297-343.
- Attar A., Casamatta C., Chassagnon A., and J.P. Decamps (2019): Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: the Role of Menus, *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 51(4): 977-990.
- Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2019): On a Class of Smooth Preferences, *Economic Theory (Bulletin)* 7: 37-57.
- Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2018): Concurrence Non-Exclusive et Sélection Adverse, *Revue Economique* 69(6): 1009-1023.
- Attar A., Campioni E., and G. Piaser (2018): On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition, *Games and Economic Behavior* 111: 1-15.
- Attar A., d'Aspremont C. (2018): Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications, in *Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization*, Edward Elgar: 425-453.
- Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2014): Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection *Theoretical Economics* 9: 1-40.
- Attar A., Campioni E., and G. Piaser (2013): Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games, *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 49(1): 62-70.
- Attar A., Campioni E., Piaser, G., and U. Rajan (2012): Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness, *Review of Economic Design* 16: 283-296.
- Attar A., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2011): Non-exclusive competition in the market for lemons, *Econometrica* 79(6): 1869-1918.
- Attar A., Campioni, E., Piaser G., and U. Rajan (2010): On multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, *Games and Economic Behavior* 68(1): 376-380.
- Attar A. and Chassagnon A. (2009): On moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts, *Journal of Mathematical Economics* 45 (9-10): 511-525.
- Attar A., Majumdar, D., Piaser, G., and N. Porteiro (2008): Common agency games: separable preferences and indifference, *Mathematical Social Sciences* 6(1): 75-95.
- Attar A., Piaser G., and N. Porteiro (2007): Negotiation and take-it or leave-it offers with non-contractible actions, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 135(1): 590-593.
- Attar A., Piaser G., and N. Porteiro (2007): On common agency models of moral hazard, *Economics Letters* 95: 278-284.
- Attar A. and E. Campioni (2007): Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy, *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics* (18) 2: 249-269.
- Attar A., Campioni E., and G. Piaser (2006): Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market, *B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Contributions)* 6(1).
- Attar A. (2004): Financial constraints and economic fluctuations, *Rivista Italiana degli Economisti*, 2: 334-358.

Attar A. and E. Campioni (2003): Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume, *Research in Economics* 4: 315-343.

Work in Progress

Attar A., Campioni E., Mariotti T., and A. Pavan (2020): Canonical Competing Mechanisms.

Attar A., Gavazza A., Mariotti T., Salanié F. and E. Sette (2020): Adverse Selection under Multiple Contracting. New empirical Results.

Attar A., Farinha Luz V., Mariotti T. and F. Salanié (2019): Mixed Strategy Equilibria, Nonexclusive Competition and Adverse Selection.

Permanent Working Papers

Attar A., Chassagnon A., and U. Rajan (2014): Bertrand-Edgeworth competition under moral hazard.

Attar A., Reiche S., and R. Strausz (2013): Mediating Renegotiation in Agency Contracts.

A. Attar (2008): Financial contracting along the business cycle.

Other Activities

Visiting Positions: UIBE Beijing, London School of Economics, ETH Zurich, Paris Dauphine, Humboldt University Berlin, EUI, University of Michigan, Vancouver School of Economics, Northwestern University.

Referee: American Economic Journal Microeconomics, American Economic Review, American Economic Review Insights, Annals of Finance, BE Journals, Econometrica, Economic Theory, Economics Letters, ERC, Games and Economic Behavior, German Economic Review, International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Surveys, Journal of European Economic Association, Journal of Finance, RAND Journal of Economics, Research in Economics, Review of Economic Design, Review of Economic Dynamics, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Finance, Swiss National Science Foundation, Theoretical Economics.

Conference Organization: Topics in Adverse Selection (AES Meeting Algiers, June 2017) Mediation in Contract Theory (Humboldt University, Berlin, Nov. 2012), Markets and Contracts (SAET Meeting, Faro, July 2011), LSE-TSE Workshop of the Paul Woolley Research Center (Spring 2010, 2011, 2012).

Research Talks (since 2010)

2020: Econometric Society World Congress (Invited Lecture).

2019: SAET Meeting.

2018: CESifo Conference on Applied Micro, EUI, UBC, Econometric Society North American Meeting (UC Davis), Collegio Carlo Alberto.

2017: UBC (Vancouver), NYU (Abu Dhabi), New Economic School (Moscow), Econometric Society African Meeting.

2016: Bank of Italy, Thema (Paris), CORE (Louvain), Humboldt workshop on Incentives and Competition (Berlin), SED conference (Toulouse), Econometric Society African Meeting.

2015: Bonn University, Paris School of Economics, EUI Florence.

2014: Chinese Academy of Sciences, University of Koln, University of Rome III, University of Caen.

2013: European University Institute, University of Milan.

2012: Max Plack Institute (Bonn), Conference in Honor of R. Townsend (Toulouse), Columbia University, NYU, CESifo Conference on Applied Micro, EEA-ESEM Meeting (Malaga).

2011: Tilburg University, European University Institute, CESifo Conference on Applied Micro, SAET Meeting, ETH-Zurich, EIEF.

2010: University of Munich, University of Mannheim , European University Institute, CESifo Conference on Applied Micro, World Congress of the Econometric Society (Shanghai), Bank of Italy, University of Rome I.