Alessio OZANNE will defend his thesis on Tuesday 1st July, 2025 at 10:00 AM (Auditorium 4 and by zoom, building TSE)
Title: Essays in Financial and Information Economic
Supervisors: Professors Matthieu Bouvard and Alexander Guembel
To attend the session, please contact the doctoral school secretariat
Memberships are:
- Matthieu Bouvard : Professor of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole Supervisor
- Alexander Guembel: Professor of Economics University of Toulouse Capitole Co-Supervisor
- Ansgar Walther : Professor of Economics, Imperial College Business School Rapporteur
- Jing Zeng : Professor of Economics, University of Bonn Rapporteure
Abstract :
This dissertation explores how the design of information and incentives can mitigate inefficiencies in financial markets. It consists of three essays at the intersection of Financial and Information Economics.
The first chapter studies the optimal transparency of credit scoring algorithms, showing that opacity can improve data sharing and credit access by reducing borrowers’ strategic behavior.
The second chapter analyzes the design of bank stress tests when market discipline complements supervision, demonstrating that coarse and lenient tests optimally leverage private information embedded in market prices.
The third chapter examines risk governance under preemptive competition among financial firms, proposing incentive schemes that align firms’ trading and compliance activities with efficient risk management. Methodologically, the first two chapters employ tools from information design and Bayesian persuasion, while the third draws on mechanism design and contract theory. Together, these essays highlight the central role of information structures and incentive mechanisms in shaping financial market outcomes and provide policy-relevant insights for the regulation of credit markets, banking supervision, and financial risk management.
