Seminar

Majority Judgment vs. Majority Rule

Rida Laraki (Université Paris Dauphine)

November 28, 2017, 11:00–12:30

Toulouse

Room MS 001

Economic Theory Seminar

Abstract

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates| and so also of Condorcet consistency|is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates|paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing ma- jority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates|lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of \polarized" candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation. It may also be viewed as a \solution" to Dahl's (reformulated) intensity problem in that an intense minority sometimes defeats an apathetic majority.