Séminaire

Majority Judgment vs. Majority Rule

Rida Laraki (Université Paris Dauphine)

28 novembre 2017, 11h00–12h30

Toulouse

Salle MS 001

Economic Theory Seminar

Résumé

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates| and so also of Condorcet consistency|is challenged. Axioms based on evaluating candidates|paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing ma- jority rule for two candidates based on comparing candidates|lead to another method, majority judgment, that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of \polarized" candidates. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation. It may also be viewed as a \solution" to Dahl's (reformulated) intensity problem in that an intense minority sometimes defeats an apathetic majority.

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