Abstract
We develop a tractable career–concerns model of expert recommendations with a continuous private signal. In equilibrium, advice obeys a cutoff rule: the expert recommends the risky option if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold. Under a mild relative–diagnosticity condition, the threshold is (weakly) increasing in reputation, yielding reputational conservatism. Signal informativeness and success priors lower the cutoff, while stronger career concerns raise it. A success–contingent bonus implements any target experimentation rate via a one–to–one mapping, providing an implementable design lever.
Keywords
career concerns; expert advice; reputational incentives; information design; experimentation;
JEL codes
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- C72: Noncooperative Games
Reference
Georgy Lukyanov, and Anna Vlasova, “Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice”, TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1715, February 2026.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1715, February 2026