Abstract
We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network providers. Market shares and service quality (download speed) are simultaneously determined, for demand affects the network load just as delivered quality affects consumer demand. While consolidation typically has adverse impacts on consumer surplus, economies of scale (which we derive from physical principles) push in the other direction, and we find that consumer surplus is maximized at a moderate number of firms, and that the optimal number of firms is higher for lower income consumers. Our modeling framework allows us to quantify the marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to mobile telecommunications, finding it is roughly five times an individual firm’s willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum.
Keywords
Market structure; scale efficiency,; antitrust policy; infrastructure; endogenous; quality; queuing, mobile telecommunications;
JEL codes
- D21: Firm Behavior: Theory
- D22: Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40: General
Reference
Jonathan Elliott, Georges Vivien Houngbonon, Marc Ivaldi, and Paul Scott, “Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications”, TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1207, May 2021, revised April 25, 2023.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 21-1207, May 2021, revised April 25, 2023