We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network providers. Market shares and service quality (download speed) are simultaneously determined, for demand affects the network load just as delivered quality affects consumer demand. While consolidation typically has adverse impacts on consumer surplus, economies of scale (which we derive from physical principles) push in the other direction, and we find that consumer surplus is maximized at a moderate number of firms, and that the optimal number of firms is higher for lower income consumers. Our modeling framework allows us to quantify the marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to mobile telecommunications, finding it is roughly five times an individual firm’s willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum.
Market structure; scale efficiency,; antitrust policy; infrastructure; endogenous; quality; queuing, mobile telecommunications;
- D21: Firm Behavior: Theory
- D22: Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40: General
Jonathan Elliott, Georges Vivien Houngbonon, Marc Ivaldi et Paul Scott, « Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications », TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1207, mai 2021, révision 25 avril 2023.
TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1207, mai 2021, révision 25 avril 2023