Abstract
This paper discusses the literature on horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms and argues that the Cournot model can provide useful insights into the welfare effects of such mergers. To illustrate those insights, we develop a simple model in which two-sided platforms offer a homogeneous service and compete à la Cournot, and derive the effects of "average-marginal-cost-preserving" mergers on consumers on both sides of the market. We conclude with a discussion of several research avenues that could be explored to understand better the impact of horizontal mergers between multi-sided platforms.
Keywords
Mergers; Multi-Sided Platforms; Cournot Competition;
JEL codes
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Replaced by
Joao Correia da silva, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili, and Joana Pinho, “Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 28, n. 1, January 2019, pp. 109–124.
Reference
Joao Correia da silva, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili, and Joana Pinho, “Horizontal Mergers Between Multi-Sided Platforms: Insights from Cournot Competition”, TSE Working Paper, n. 18-946, August 2018.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 18-946, August 2018