What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by their success in terms of resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combinations of selfishness and morality stand out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her material payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of material payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality - the weight placed on the moral goal - equals the index of assortativity in the matching process. The motivation of homo moralis is arguably compatible with how people often reason, and the induced behavior agrees with pro-social behaviors observed in many laboratory experiments.
evolutionary stability; preference evolution; moral values; incomplete information; assortative matching;
- C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- D03: Behavioral Microeconomics • Underlying Principles
Ingela Alger, and Jörgen W. Weibull, “Homo moralis - Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching ”, Econometrica, vol. 81, n. 6, November 2013, pp. 2269–2302.
Ingela Alger, and Jörgen W. Weibull, “Homo Moralis-Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching”, TSE Working Paper, n. 12-281, February 2012.
TSE Working Paper, n. 12-281, February 2012