We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as ﬁrst raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)’s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents’ game.
Competing Mechanisms; Equilibrium Existence;
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Gwenaël Piaser, “Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals”, TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1364, September 2022.
TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1364, September 2022