We study competing-mechanism games, in which multiple principals contract with multiple agents. We reconsider the issue of non-existence of an equilibrium as ﬁrst raised by Myerson (1982). In the context of his example, we establish the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We clarify that Myerson (1982)’s non-existence result is an implication of the additional requirement he imposes, that each principal selects his preferred continuation equilibrium in the agents’ game.
Competing Mechanisms; Equilibrium Existence;
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni et Gwenaël Piaser, « Equilibrium (non-)Existence in Games with Competing Principals », TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1364, septembre 2022.
TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1364, septembre 2022