Abstract
This paper studies access pricing in a vertically separated railway sector where the in-frastructure manager sets access charges and chooses network quality, while downstream operators choose transport services. The model characterizes the inefficiencies of unregula-ted vertical separation and then derives optimal regulation with and without public transfers. When transfers are constrained, access charges follow a Ramsey logic modified by downs-tream market power and by cross-effects among long-distance operators. Under asymmetric information, the relevant access cost is no longer the physical marginal cost but a virtual cost that incorporates the information rents of the infrastructure manager and the traffic consequences of incentive constraints.
Keywords
Access pricing; railroad regulation; vertical separation; infrastructure quality; asymmetric information; mechanism design; information rents;
JEL codes
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- L92: Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
- L43: Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- H21: Efficiency • Optimal Taxation
Reference
Philippe Bontems, Marie-Françoise Calmette, and David Martimort, “Tarification d’accès et qualité du réseau dans le transport ferroviaire”, TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1753, June 2026.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1753, June 2026