Abstract
We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).
Keywords
Internet; Neutrality;
JEL codes
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software
Replaces
Bruno Jullien, and Wilfried Sand-Zantman, “Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data”, TSE Working Paper, n. 12-327, June 2012, revised December 2017.
Reference
Bruno Jullien, and Wilfried Sand-Zantman, “Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 58, May 2018, pp. 31–62.
See also
Published in
International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 58, May 2018, pp. 31–62