We consider zero-rating by Internet service providers. We analyze the implications of offering sponsored data plans that allow content providers to pay for traffic on behalf of their consumers. These plans boost consumption of high-value content and decrease the networks'incentives to exclude low-value content. The welfare effect of allowing this price discrimination depends on the proportion of content targeted and the value of contents. Our analysis is extended to various cases (one-sided pricing, competing network, heterogenous cost, paid contents).
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- L51: Economics of Regulation
- L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software
Bruno Jullien et Wilfried Sand-Zantman, « Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data », TSE Working Paper, n° 12-327, juin 2012, révision décembre 2017.
Bruno Jullien et Wilfried Sand-Zantman, « Internet Regulation, Two-Sided Pricing, and Sponsored Data », International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 58, mai 2018, p. 31–62.