Article

Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts

Guillaume Cheikbossian, and Romain Fayat

Abstract

We revisit the group size paradox in a model where two groups of different sizes compete for a prize exhibiting a varying degree of rivalry and where group effort is given by a CES function of individual e¤orts. We show that the larger group can be more successful than the smaller group if the degree of complementarity is sufficiently high relative to the degree of rivalry of the prize.

Keywords

group size paradox; group contest; complementarity; (impure) public good;

JEL codes

  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D74: Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances

Replaces

Guillaume Cheikbossian, and Romain Fayat, Group Size, Collective Action and Complementarities in Efforts, TSE Working Paper, n. 18-918, May 2018.

Reference

Guillaume Cheikbossian, and Romain Fayat, Collective Action, Group Size and Complementarities in Efforts, Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168, July 2018, pp. 77–81.

Published in

Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168, July 2018, pp. 77–81