Working paper

Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber

JEL codes

  • C71: Cooperative Games
  • C72: Noncooperative Games
  • D62: Externalities
  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations

Replaced by

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets”, Economic Theory, Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, vol. 25, n. 1, January 2005, pp. 187–201.

Reference

Michel Le Breton, and Shlomo Weber, “Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 209, 2003.

See also

Published in

IDEI Working Paper, n. 209, 2003