Abstract
We develop a framework to study horizontal mergers when the parties can propose remedies to an antitrust authority. Remedies are modeled as asset divestitures, which make the firm receiving the assets more efficient at the expense of the merged firm. We consider both the case where the merger affects a single market and where it affects multiple markets. Solving for the merging firms’ optimal proposal, we investigate when it involves remedies—and if so, which assets should be divested, and to whom, and how this depends on market characteristics such as the level of competitiveness.
Keywords
Antitrust; horizontal mergers; structural remedies; divestitures; data;
JEL codes
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40: General
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Reference
Volker Nocke, and Andrew Rhodes, “Optimal Merger Remedies”, TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1660, August 2025.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 25-1660, August 2025