Working paper

Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle Versus Stackelberg

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, and Eugenio Peluso

JEL codes

  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • H41: Public Goods

Replaced by

Philippe De Donder, Michel Le Breton, and Eugenio Peluso, Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 14, n. 6, December 2012, pp. 879–909.

See also

Published in

CEPR Discussion Paper, n. 7646, January 2010