Working paper

Large Risks, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard

Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve

JEL codes

  • C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
  • D92: Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing

Replaces

Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve, Environmental Risk Insurance under Dynamic Moral Hazard, 2007.

Replaced by

Bruno Biais, Thomas Mariotti, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Stéphane Villeneuve, Large Risks, Limited Liability, and Dynamic Moral Hazard, Econometrica, vol. 78, n. 1, January 2010, pp. 73–118.

Published in

IDEI Working Paper, n. 472, August 2007, revised September 2009