A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Abstract

We adapt the methods from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) to finitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring. Under a combination of (a slight strengthening of) the assumptions of Benoıˆt and Krishna (1985) and those of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994), a folk theorem follows. Three counterexamples show that our assumptions are tight.

Keywords

JEL codes

Replaced by

Johannes Hörner, and Jérôme Renault, “A Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 236, n. 106227, September 2026.

Reference

Johannes Hörner, and Jérôme Renault, “A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring”, TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1473, September 2023.