Abstract
Faced with a scarcity of treatments for neglected diseases, experts and governmental organizations have lately proposed to build strong pull incentives around transferable vouchers. Inventors would be granted, and allowed to sell these vouchers to pharmas desiring to extend their exclusive IP rights. However, we know little about how such “Transferable Exclusivity Extensions” fare relative to prizes, who is likely to acquire them and at what cost for society, or how the burden is shared among nations. We shed light on these questions, both from a theoretical perspective and from an empirical analysis of European data.
Keywords
Vouchers; pull mechanisms; burden sharing; administered drug prices; prizes;
JEL codes
- I18: Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health
- L5: Regulation and Industrial Policy
- O3: Technological Change • Research and Development • Intellectual Property Rights
Reference
Pierre Dubois, Paul-Henri Moisson, and Jean Tirole, “The Economics of Transferable Patent Extensions”, TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1377, November 2022, revised December 2022.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 22-1377, November 2022, revised December 2022