Working paper

Dynamics of Political Systems

Lukas Buchheim, and Robert Ulbricht

Abstract

We develop a quantitative theory of repeated political transitions driven by revolts and reforms. In the model, the beliefs of disenfranchised citizens play a key role in determining revolutionary pressure, which in interaction with preemptive reforms determines regime dynamics. We estimate the model structurally, targeting key moments of the data. The estimated model generates a process of political transitions that looks remarkably close to the data, replicating the empirical shape of transition hazards, the frequency of revolts relative to reforms, the distribution of newly established regime types after revolts and reforms, and the unconditional distribution over regime types. Using the estimated model, we also explore circumstances of successful democratization, finding that the sentiment of political outsiders is key for creating a window of opportunity, whereas the scope of the initial democratic reform is key for the survival of young democracies.

Keywords

Democratic reforms; regime dynamics; revolts; structural estimation; transition hazards;

JEL codes

  • D74: Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances
  • D78: Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
  • P16: Political Economy

Reference

Lukas Buchheim, and Robert Ulbricht, Dynamics of Political Systems, TSE Working Paper, n. 14-464, February 1, 2014, revised October 2018.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 14-464, February 1, 2014, revised October 2018