Abstract
This paper develops a model of niche lobbying in which interest groups endogenously specialize in the acquisition of distinct types of policy-relevant information. Contrary to the view that niche strategies are chosen to soften competition and secure autonomy, we show that specialization arises as a self-enforcing equilibrium even though groups would prefer to compete over the same informational dimensions. The mechanism is demand-driven: when information acquisition is private and nonverifiable, the decision-maker’s inference from silence intensifies informational pressure on specialized groups, increasing the burden of information acquisition. We discuss the implications of these results for interest groups influence in climate and biodiversity policy.
Keywords
Lobbying, Information Acquisition, Niche Expertise, Hard Information Communication, Specialization;
JEL codes
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
Reference
Perrin Lefebvre, and David Martimort, “A Demand-Side Driven Explanation of Niche Lobbying: A Theory and Some Application to Climate-Biodiversity Policy”, TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1706, January 2026.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 26-1706, January 2026