Working paper

Decentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements

Doh-Shin Jeon, and Yassine Lefouili

Abstract

We consider an industry with n≥3 firms owning upstream inputs and interacting noncooperatively in a downstream market. Under general conditions, upstream bilateral agreements giving firms access to one another's input lead to industry profit maximization. This decentralization result applies to various upstream agreements including cross-licensing agreements among patent-holding manufacturers, interconnection agreements among telecommunication companies, interbank payments for ATM networks, and data-sharing agreements among competitors or complementors.

Keywords

Bilateral oligopoly; upstream agreement; cooperation;

JEL codes

  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Reference

Doh-Shin Jeon, and Yassine Lefouili, Decentralizing Cooperation through Upstream Bilateral Agreements, TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1119, June 2020.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1119, June 2020