Working paper

The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia

Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci

Abstract

This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium while libraries with opposite preferences almost always gain from it. Our results suggest a strong tension between a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy as long as the former dictates forming a consortium around libraries with homogenous preferences in order to gain from quantity discounts. This tension might create a "library consortium trap".

Keywords

Library Consortium; Academic Journals; Personalized Prices; Cor- relation; Multimarket contact; Level-playing Field;

JEL codes

  • D4: Market Structure and Pricing
  • K21: Antitrust Law
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
  • L82: Entertainment • Media

Replaced by

Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci, The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia, The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 65, n. 1, March 2017, pp. 105–135.

See also

Published in

TSE Working Paper, n. 13-425, August 21, 2013, revised December 2015