Document de travail

The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia

Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci

Résumé

This paper identifies strategies to build a library consortium from a long term point of view. Contrary to the conventional wisdom to build a consortium around groups of homogenous institutions (Davis, 2002), we find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium while libraries with opposite preferences almost always gain from it. Our results suggest a strong tension between a short-term strategy and a long-term strategy as long as the former dictates forming a consortium around libraries with homogenous preferences in order to gain from quantity discounts. This tension might create a "library consortium trap".

Mots-clés

Library Consortium; Academic Journals; Personalized Prices; Cor- relation; Multimarket contact; Level-playing Field;

Codes JEL

  • D4: Market Structure and Pricing
  • K21: Antitrust Law
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
  • L82: Entertainment • Media

Remplacé par

Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci, « The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia », The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 65, n° 1, mars 2017, p. 105–135.

Référence

Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci, « The Benefits of Diverse Preferences in Library Consortia », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-425, 21 août 2013, révision décembre 2015.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 13-425, 21 août 2013, révision décembre 2015