Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.

JEL codes

Replaced by

Alban Thomas, and Vera Zaporozhets, “Bargaining over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy”, Environmental and Resource Economics, Springer Netherlands, vol. 68, n. 2, October 2017, pp. 227–248.

Reference

Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas, and Vera Zaporozhets, “Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion”, TSE Working Paper, n. 12-324, July 18, 2012.