In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical non-cooperative model of bargaining to analyse project funding in the French river basin com- mittees. After sorting out some of the main theoretical predictions, we proceed with an empirical application to the subsidy policy of French Wa- ter Agencies. The theoretical model of bargaining is simulated for various risk preferences, and a reduced-form estimation of the distribution of sub- sidies is performed. We find some evidence in support of the predictions regarding the role of bargaining in decision-making for water management.
- D10: General
- D64: Altruism • Philanthropy
- D91: Intertemporal Household Choice • Life Cycle Models and Saving
- E21: Consumption • Saving • Wealth
Alban Thomas et Vera Zaporozhets, « Bargaining over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy », Environmental and Resource Economics, Springer Netherlands, vol. 68, n° 2, octobre 2017, p. 227–248.
Michel Le Breton, Alban Thomas et Vera Zaporozhets, « Bargaining in River Basin Committees: Rules Versus Discretion », TSE Working Paper, n° 12-324, 18 juillet 2012.
TSE Working Paper, n° 12-324, 18 juillet 2012