A Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Abstract

We provide a Folk theorem for finitely repeated games under imperfect public monitoring, under a strengthening of the standard assumptions required for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, and of those for discounted repeated games under imperfect public monitoring. Our proof uses standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public randomization device. Three counterexamples show in which sense our assumptions are tight.

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Replaces

Johannes Hörner, and Jérôme Renault, “A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring”, TSE Working Paper, n. 23-1473, September 2023.

Reference

Johannes Hörner, and Jérôme Renault, “A Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 236, n. 106227, September 2026.