A Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring

Résumé

We provide a Folk theorem for finitely repeated games under imperfect public monitoring, under a strengthening of the standard assumptions required for finitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, and of those for discounted repeated games under imperfect public monitoring. Our proof uses standard recursive methods and assumes the existence of a public randomization device. Three counterexamples show in which sense our assumptions are tight.

Mots-clés

Codes JEL

Remplace

Johannes Hörner et Jérôme Renault, « A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring », TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1473, septembre 2023.

Référence

Johannes Hörner et Jérôme Renault, « A Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 236, n° 106227, septembre 2026.