Title: «Equilibrium Sorting in Competitive Markets with Search and Informational Frictions»
Supervisor: Emmanuelle Auriol
- Roland Bénabou, Professor, University of Princeton
- Pierre André Chiappori, Professor University of Columbia
- Thomas Mariotti, CNRS Senior researcher
- Emmanuelle Auriol, Professor, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole, TSE
This dissertation aims to better understand how market forces partition economic agents across segments of a market, i.e. sorting. The focus is put on the interplay between sorting and the imperfections of said market, such as search frictions, information asymmetries, and externalities. The main contribution of this theoretical work is to characterize the equilibrium sorting in classes of economic models that are employed to study various key topics, including unemployment and corporate social responsibility. The tools used in this dissertation belong mainly to the fields of economic theory, industrial organization, and behavioral economics.