Article

When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?

Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci

JEL codes

  • O16: Financial Markets • Saving and Capital Investment • Corporate Finance and Governance
  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • G20: General

Replaces

Reference

Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci, When Is the Optimal Lending Contract in Microfinance State Non-Contingent?, European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55, n. 5, June 2011, pp. 720–731.

Published in

European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55, n. 5, June 2011, pp. 720–731