Article

Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin

Abstract

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay for performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a "pay-for-percentile" or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.

JEL codes

  • C93: Field Experiments
  • I21: Analysis of Education
  • J23: Labor Demand
  • J33: Compensation Packages • Payment Methods
  • J41: Labor Contracts
  • J45: Public Sector Labor Markets
  • O15: Human Resources • Human Development • Income Distribution • Migration

Reference

Clare Leaver, Owen Ozier, Pieter Serneels, and Andrew Zeitlin, Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants: Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools, American Economic Review, vol. 111, n. 7, July 2021, pp. 2213–2246.

Published in

American Economic Review, vol. 111, n. 7, July 2021, pp. 2213–2246