Article

A Passion for Voting

Elena Panova

Abstract

We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies.

Keywords

Expressive voting; Self-signaling; Ignorant voting; Habitual voting; Bandwagon and underdog effects; Information aggregation in elections; Status quo bias;

JEL codes

  • D03: Behavioral Microeconomics • Underlying Principles
  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
  • P16: Political Economy

Reference

Elena Panova, “A Passion for Voting”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 90, March 2015, pp. 44–65.

See also

Published in

Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 90, March 2015, pp. 44–65