Abstract
This paper examines how horizontal mergers affect firms’ incentives to invest in R&D leading to the development of new products. We characterize the impact of a merger to monopoly and a 3-to-2 merger on equilibrium innovation efforts and consumer surplus, absent efficiency gains and spillovers. We show that a 3-to-2 merger directly alters the outsider’s innovation incentives by shifting its best-response function upward, and we analyze how this mechanism affects merger outcomes for innovation and consumer surplus. Finally, we examine how efficiency gains and remedies modify post-merger innovation efforts.
Keywords
Horizontal Mergers; Product Innovation; R&D Investments.;
JEL codes
- K21: Antitrust Law
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40: General
Reference
Anna D’Annunzio, Yassine Lefouili, Bruno Jullien, and Leonardo Madio, “Mergers and Investments in New Products”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, June 2026, forthcoming.
See also
Published in
International Journal of Industrial Organization, June 2026, forthcoming
