Abstract
This paper studies the effect of media market competition on confirmatory bias, the tendency to confirm common priors to appear competent, while accounting for both single- and multi-homing. It finds that competition helps sustain informative reporting when priors are relatively precise, but has the opposite effect when priors are diffuse. The reason is that when competing outlets are perceived as similarly competent, consumers optimally multi-home. This creates strategic complementarity in informative reporting and helps sustain it when the priors are relatively precise. However, when perceived competencies diverge, consumers single-home with the outlet they view as most competent, creating incentives for confirmatory reporting when the priors are diffuse.
Keywords
confirmation bias; competition; single- and multi-homing;
JEL codes
- L82: Entertainment • Media
- L10: General
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Replaces
Elena Panova, “Media market structure and confirmatory news”, TSE Working Paper, n. 24-1597, November 2024, revised March 2026.
Reference
Elena Panova, “Media market structure and confirmatory news”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, March 2026.
See also
Published in
The Journal of Industrial Economics, March 2026