We study two-player contests in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf; neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when the delegates choose their effort levels. We obtain first the outcomes of this unobservable-contracts case. Next, we perform comparative statics of these outcomes with respect to the higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize. Finally, we compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case. We find, among other things, that the unobservability of delegation contracts narrows the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation.
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Kyung Hwan Baik, and Jihyun Kim, “Contests with Bilateral Delegation: Unobservable Contracts”, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 170, n. 3, September 2014, pp. 387–405.
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 170, n. 3, September 2014, pp. 387–405