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Kyung Hwan Baik, and Jihyun Kim
vol. 170, n. 3, September 2014, pp. 387–405
We study two-player contests in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf; neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when the delegates choose their effort levels. We obtain first the outcomes of this unobservable-contracts...
Claude Crampes, and Thomas-Olivier Léautier
September 30, 2014
Jacques Delpla
September 25, 2014
Marc Ivaldi
September 24, 2014
David Le Bris, and Sébastien Pouget
September 20, 2014
Bruno Biais
September 18, 2014
September 16, 2014
