advanced search

Julie Subervie (INRAE;Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement de Montpellier)

Toulouse: TSE, March 15, 2021, 11:00–12:15, Zoom

In many African countries, rural households typically sell their crops immediately after the harvest, and then face severe food shortages during the lean season. This paper explores whether alleviating both credit and storage constraints through an inventory credit (orwarrantage) program in Burkina...

Seminar

Jeffrey Franks

Toulouse: TSE, March 11, 2021, 17:00–18:00, room Online

France has been one the European countries most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and has consequently faced one the largest economic shocks. The webinar will present the latest views of the IMF on the crisis, the French authorities’ response, and policies needed to create a more inclusive, green...

Seminar

Alessandra Casella (Columbia University)

March 11, 2021, 15:30–17:00, Zoom

Mechanism design teaches us that a mediator can strictly improve the chances of peace between two opponents even when the mediator has no independent resources, is less informed than the two parties, and has no enforcement power. We test the theory in a lab experiment where two subjects negotiate...

Seminar

Panayotis Mertikopoulos ( CNRS;Institut Montpelliérain Alexander Grothendieck (IMAG) - Université de Montpellier)

Toulouse: TSE, March 11, 2021, 11:00–12:15, Zoom

This talk aims to survey the triple-point interface between optimization, game theory, and dynamical systems. We will begin by discussing how the ordinary differential equation (ODE) method of stochastic approximation can be used to analyze the trajectories of a wide array of stochastic first-order...

Seminar

Online, March 10 to March 10, 2021

Conference

Federico Bugni (Duke University)

TSE, March 9, 2021, 15:30–16:50, Zoom

The literature on dynamic discrete games often assumes that the conditional choice probabilities and the state transition probabilities are homogeneous across markets and over time. We refer to this as the \homogeneity assumption" in dynamic discrete games. This homogeneity assumption enables...

Seminar

Fuhito Kojima (University of Tokyo)

Toulouse: TSE, March 9, 2021, 14:30–16:00, Online

We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order, or in short weak monotone comparative statics, and identify the enabling conditions in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices for a coalition of agents, and Nash equilibria of games. Compared with the...

Seminar

Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan School of Management)

March 9, 2021, 14:00–15:00, Zoom Meeting

We propose a model of data intermediation to analyze the incentives for sharing individual data in the presence of informational externalities. A data intermediary acquires signals from individual consumers regarding their preferences. The intermediary resells the information in a product market...

Seminar

Anmol Bhandari (University of Minnesota)

TSE, March 9, 2021, 14:00–15:30, room Zoom

Managing public portfolios is a crucial policy issue that concerns economists, policymakers, and the general public. However, existing literature on debt management offers little practical guidance on the types of securities it should issue and the frequency with which a government should rebalance...

Seminar

Michelle Sovinsky (University of Mannheim)

TSE, March 8, 2021, 14:00–15:30, Zoom

As illicit substances move into legal product space, substitution patterns with legal products become more salient. In particular, marijuana legalization may have implications for use of other "sin" goods, such as alcohol and cigarettes. We focus on a young person's choice to consume marijuana,...

Seminar